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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
RENNOLD PENDER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SALT
LAKE CITY, a public corporation,
et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 8469

BRIEF IN ANSWER TO PETITION
FOR REHEARING

THE DECISION OF THE COURT CORRECTLY
SETS FORTH THE APPLICABLE LAW
Throughout these proceedings, appellant has erroneously insisted that the pre-emptive settler upon the
school lands here involved obtained a vested right to
the property by the mere fact of his possession. The quotation at page 2 of this court's opinion plainly refutes
appellant's contention.
"The U. S. Supreme Court has construed
these statutes as not conferring any vested interest upon a mere settler, even though he might
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improve the property, build a home thereon, and
reside there. In the case of Gonzales v. French,
164 U.S. 338, 17 S. Ct. 85, 41 L. Ed. 458, the Court
reiterated the language of Shepley v. Cowan, 91
U.S. 330, 23 L. Ed. 424:
" 'In those cases, Frisbie v. Whitney and
the Yosemite Valley Case, the court decided
that a party, by mere settlement upon the
public lands, with an intention to obtain a
title to the same under the pre-emption laws,
did 'not thereby acquire such a vested interest
in the premises as to deprive congress of
the power to dispose of the property; that,
notwithstanding the settlement, congress
could reserve the lands for sale whenever
they might be needed for public uses, as for
arsenals, fortifications, lighthouses, customhouses, and other public purposes for which
real property is required by the government;
that the settlement, even \vhen accompanied
with an improvement of the property, did not
confer upon the settler any right in the land
as against the United States, or impair in
any respect the power of congress to dispose
of the land in any way it might deem proper;
that the power of regulation and disposition
conferred upon congress by the constitution
only ceased when all the preliminary acts
prescribed by law for the acquisition of the
title, including the payment of the price of
the land, had been performed by the settler.
\Vhen these prerequisites were con1plied
with, the settler for the first time acquired
a vested right in the premises of which he
could not be subsequently deprived. He was
then entitled to a certificate of entrY from
the local land officers, and ultimateiy to a
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patent of the United States. Until such payment and entry, the acts of congress gave to
the settler only a privilege of pre-emption in
case the lands were offered for sale in the
usual manner; that is, the privilege to purchase them in that event in preference to
others.'
"The case of Buxton v. Traver, 130 U.S.
232, 9 S. Ct. 509, characterizes the pre-emption
statutes as an offer by the government, conditioned upon filing a declaratory statement and
performing certain other acts. Unless these conditions are met, there is no acceptance of the offer and no rights .arise in favor of the settler.
See also Railroad v. Stringham, 38 Utah 113,
110 P. 868, aff'd on appeal on another issue, 229
U.S. 44,36 S. Ct. 5, 60 L. Ed. 136."
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Appellant claims that the Act of 1891 (28 Feb. 1891;
26 Stat. 796) rather than the Act of 1859 (26 Feb. 1859;
11 Stat. 385) is the .applicable statute and that the change
in phraseology " ... in lieu of such as may be patented
by pre-emptors . . . " (1859) to " . . . in lieu of such
land as may be thus taken by pre-emption ... " (1891)
has significance. The reasoning of this court's opinion
was simply that the very statute upon which appellant
relies makes it clear that the pre-e1nptive title had to be
perfected before the state's right to the particular school
section was divested. The phrase "subject to the claims"
(1891) or ''subject to the pre-emption claim" (1859) expresses this reasoning in either instance and the change
in phraseology "1nay be patented" to "may be thus taken
by pre-emption" does not alter the Congressional intent
to any material extent insofar as the issue here con-
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cerned. But the fact of the matter is that D. Hendrix
and John Prye et al. failed to file their declaratory statement in the district land office within three months
from the time of the settlement (pursuant to Sec. 2265
Rev. Stat. 1878, 3 March 1843; 5 Stat. 620); or within
three months from the date of the receipt at the district
land office of the approved plat of the township (Sec.
2266 Rev. Stat. 1878, 30 ~lay 1862; 12 Stat. 410) or
in any event within thirty 1nonths after the date prescribed for filing their declaratory notice has expired
(Sec. 2267 Rev. Stat. 1878, 14 .July 1870; 16 Stat. 279).
The pre-emptive right having been forfeited long before
1891, the decision of this court correctly cites and applies
the act of 1859.
The single statute upon which appellant bases his
entire case deals with the subject matter of lieu land
selections by the state. It does not purport to obviate
the necessity of timely compliance with the preliminary
acts prescribed by law for the acquisition of title. The
statutes can and 1nust be construed harmoniously. The
Act of 1891 was passed three days before the pre-emption laws were repealed (3 ~Iar. 1891; 26 Stat. 1097) so
the change in phraseology made it clear that lieu land
selections could continue to be n1ade as long as all bona
fide pre-emptive claims which had been previously initiated were perfected upon due compliance with law.
The possessory claim of the settler had to be duly
perfected in order to prevent the statutory reservation
to the territory for school purposes from becoming operaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tive. Appellant has cited no case contrary to this proposition. The Supreme Court of the United States in
Gonzales v. French, 164 U.S. 338, 17 S. Ct. 102, 41 L. Ed.
-158 stated :
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"As they (pre-ernptioners) did not choose to
assert their rights by filing a declaratory staternent, or by making an entry as pre-emptioners,
their mere possession did not prevent the rights
of the territory from attaching to the school section when the survey was made."
This survey was made in 1878 while the school section
was reserved to the . A. rizona territory in 1850.

; I

The federal statutory scheme of granting school sections to the various states commenced long before statehood. On September 9, 1850 Congress exercised its sovereign power and reserved for the purpose of being applied
to schools, sections 16 and 36 in each township, in the
Territories of New Mexico, Utah, Colorado, Dakota,
Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, and in the
States and Territories to be erected out of the same
(9 Stat. 452). Thus Congress disposed of the tract now
situated at 19th East Street and l(ensington Avenue in
Section 16, T. 1 S., R. 1 E., S. L.M. The fact that this
school land was reserved prior to the settlement by D.
Hendrix does not make it any less operative upon his
failure to file the required declaratory statement in the
district land office to perfect his possessory claim.
Appellant quotes half of a sentence only in his attempt to color with authority his petition for a rehearing.
The matter inserted in brackets below is the remaining
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language omitted from the sentence quoted by appellant
from Thompson v. Savidge, 110 Wash. 486, 188 Pac. 397
at 402.
"However, if title to the particular lands in
question did not vest in the state upon its admission to the Union, .and has not since then vested in
the state, because of pre-emption and homestead
claims initiated by settlement prior to government
survey, because of the creation of national forest
reservations, (or because of want of government
survey thereof, we think it plain that a relinquishment of the state's claim thereto, and the exercise
of its rights to select other lands in lieu thereof
to which it will immediately acquire a completely
vested title, will not be a disposition of the granted school lands of the state in violation of these
constitutional provisions.)"
A careful study of the above case will demonstrate
that it lends no support whatever to .appellant's contentions. ':rhe Washington Supreme Court is assuming
that there was a valid title based on compliance with all
the pre-en1ption requirements, in order to discuss a state
constitutional question. The decision holds that the
school land gr.ant "did not vest title to sections 16 and
36 in the state prior to survey thereof.·~ In the instant
case the survey was made in 1856, at which time the
reservation to the territory attached. The Supreme Court
decisions cited in the petition for rehearing squarely support the decision rendered herein. Shepley r. Cozcan,
91 U.S. 330, 23 L. Ed. 424; Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold
& S. Ill in. Co., 93 U.S. 634, :28 L. Ed. 995; United States
v. Morrison, 242 U.S. 192, 36 S. Ct. 326, 60 L. Ed. 599.
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Shepley v. Cowan is the case cited in the quotation from
Gonzales v. French cited in this court's opinion. In
United States v. Morrison, supra, the federal government
withdrew school lands in the Cascade Forest Reserve,
State of Oregon, .after the date of statehood but before
the survey was finally accepted by the Commissioner
of the General Land Office. The holding of the Supreme
Court of the United States that the State of Oregon did
not take title to the land prior to the survey is entirely
consistent with the adjudication in the case at bar.
The decisions of the federal Supreme Court quoted
herein indicate that the territorial rights attached and
became vested in this property at the time of survey,
subject to the possibility of being divested by pre-emption. The burden was upon the individual, not the territory, to take the necessary steps to prevent title from
passing according to the clear expression of the Organic
Act of 1850 and the subsequent grant embodied in the
Enabling Act of 1894. The decision of this court is clear,
concise and correctly applies the appropriate case law
and statutes.
However, there is no justification for the court's
assumption that Rennold Pender was entitled to commence a suit to quiet title in the District Court of Salt
Lake County before exhausting his administrative remedy. The application for federal patent which was rejected was made by Mr. Pender pursuant to the color
of title act, section 1068, Title 43 U.S.C.A. The determination of whether or not ~ir. Pender qualified as a sue-
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cessor 1n interest of D. Hendrix and had a valid preemptive right was a question of federal law to be determined between Pender and the District l\Ianager of the
Bureau of Land Management. Upon consideration of
that question and its conclusion against him, Mr. Pender's
only recourse was to appeal to the Director of the Bureau
of Land ~Ianagement. See Section 221.5 of the Rules and
Regulations of the Bureau of Land l\1:anagement published at page 461 of 43 Code of Federal RegulationsThere is a statement in the last paragraph of Mr.
House's letter of rejection to the effect that:
"Until the adverse conflicting claim of the
State of Utah is eliminated, the application of
Pender to purchase the land under the claim of
color of title may not be considered favorably."
But, there is no authority in the statutes, or regulations,
for the Bureau of Land Management to divest itself of
jurisdiction in this matter. This question of the commencement of proceedings in the district court should
not be confused with the statutory authorization of such
proceedings to determine adverse claims to application
for mining patent under section 30 Title 30 U.S.C.A.
There is no authority whateyer for the failure of Pender
to appeal to the Director of the Bureau of Land l\1anagement, but bring a quiet title suit instead.
The motion for sunuuary judg1uent in this case can
be sustained for the sole reason that Pender does not
claim under any p.atent whatsoever, and the district
courts of this state are not the proper forun1 for him to
attempt to obtain one. Respondent submits that the opinSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ion of this court should not infer that the district courts
of this state are available to applicants aggrieved by
decisions of the Bureau of Land Management concerning
color of title applications, until they have duly complied
with the prescribed administrative procedure. Sections
57 to 60 inclusive, on Public Lands in 42 Am. J ur. review
this matter thoroughly and at page 837 it is stated:
"In the absence of fraud, the decisions of the
officers of the Land Department of the government as to matters within their jurisdiction are
final and conclusive, except as they may be reversed on appeal in that department."
The statement in the opinion of this court that after
notification of rejection of his application "Pender then
filed a quiet title suit ... " is erroneous since the complaint was filed M.ay 6, 1952 and the letter of rejection of
application is dated July 9, 1952.

It is respectfully suggested that this sentence be
corrected and the additional sentence inserted at the conclusion of the opinion :
"At any rate as Pender did not appeal from
the decision of the District Manager of the Bureau
of L.and Management, he must be deemed to have
acquiesced therein and concluded thereby. Gonzales v. French, Railroad v. Stringham, supra."
See the additional case's to this effect .at page 24 of respondent's brief.
Nothing has been presented by appellant's petition
for rehearing which has not been considered and deter-
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mined in the court's decision. The petition should be
denied for as the court states:
"Under the U.S. Supreme Court cases cited
supra the only possible conclusion to be drawn in
the present case is that appellant has no rights
whatever in the property."
Respectfully submitted,

MARR, WILKINS & CANNON
RICHARD H. NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent.
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